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Abstract 
For more than 20 years, the United States and the European Union have engaged in often-
contentious negotiations over access to government procurement. The EU is dissatisfied with the 
level of procurement that the US has opened under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
and, as a consequence, it does not give the US its most comprehensive coverage. The US has been 
constrained in responding to the EU’s requests for greater access, especially to state procurement, 
by both its federal structure of government and by domestic purchasing requirements. At the 
current time, neither party has proposed a way to break the impasse.  
This paper reviews the current state of affairs between the US and the EU on government 
procurement, examining the procurement that they open to one another and the procurement that 
they withhold. It then proposes a strategy for the two sides to use the TTIP negotiations to move 
forward. This strategy includes both steps to expand their current commitments in the TTIP, as 
well as to develop a longer-term approach by making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’. This strategy 
suggests that the EU and the US could find a way to expand their access to government 
procurement contracts and at least partially defuse the issue.  
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1. Introduction 
For the past 35 years, the European Union and the United States have played leading roles in 
the development of international rules that apply to government procurement (or public 
procurement). They are parties to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), 
which accounts for only a quarter of the membership of the WTO, as well as other bilateral 
and regional agreements with procurement commitments. Their interest in procurement 
obligations arises from the significant role that government procurement plays in most 
economies.  
International agreements that provide disciplines for procurement have two elements:  one is 
procurement rules and the second is the procurement that is subject to those rules. The EU and 
the US share similar views with regard to procurement rules, which are intended to ensure 
that procurement is conducted in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, 
predictable and fair. But they have had differences with respect to the procurement that they 
open to one another. As a consequence, they have engaged in often contentious negotiations 
on government procurement for more than 20 years now. Their current procurement 
commitments and unresolved issues provide the basis for the TTIP negotiations.   
Under the current state of affairs, the EU does not accord the US its most comprehensive 
coverage because it is dissatisfied with the level of procurement that the US has opened under 
the GPA. The US is constrained in responding to the EU’s complaints by both its federal 
structure of government and its domestic purchasing requirements, only a few of which it has 
removed in international agreements. More often, the US has excluded procurement subject 
to such restrictions from its international obligations. In contrast to the EU’s quest for access 
to more US procurement, American suppliers are more or less satisfied with their access to 
procurement in Europe.  
This report aims to help the reader understand how the EU-US procurement relationship has 
reached its current state. It begins with an overview of the nature of government procurement 
markets, considering the size of the markets and penetration ratios of public procurement. It 
then examines the international procurement agreements that apply to the EU and the US, 
looking at both procurement rules and procurement commitments. It will detail the 
procurement that the EU and the US have agreed to open to one another, and the procurement 
that they exclude from their respective commitments.   
The report then turns to how the EU and US might build on their existing commitments and 
defuse this long-contentious issue. Both sides have articulated objectives with respect to 
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government procurement under the TTIP. The EU has placed a high priority on procurement 
in the TTIP and has specified a number of areas of interest. While the US has not singled out 
procurement as a priority, it has identified several objectives. The study proposes expansion 
of existing procurement commitments in several areas. At the same time, it points out some of 
the hurdles to an expansion of covered procurement, in particular with respect to US states. 
The report also considers how the TTIP might expand procurement rules that could have 
ramifications beyond the TTIP and set new international standards.   
Given the likely difficulty in resolving all of their outstanding procurement issues in the TTIP 
negotiations, the report proposes ways for the parties to continue addressing these issues with 
the TTIP as a ‘living agreement’. It focuses on the potential use of a forum that the EU and the 
US established at the end of 2011. The paper also addresses the possibility of linking progress 
in the procurement negotiations to other sectors of the TTIP.  
2. The nature of government procurement markets 
2.1 The size of procurement markets 
According to OECD Secretariat estimates, public procurement accounted for on average 13% 
of GDP in the OECD economies in 2011. If one adds state-owned enterprises (SOEs) this can 
mean an additional 2-12% of GDP, depending on the country. In all economies it is also the 
sector that has been least touched by the general liberalisation paradigm of the 1980s and 
1990s. There are, therefore, significant potential economic and welfare gains to be achieved 
from more transparent, competitive and efficient procurement. At first glance, public 
procurement looks like an area of considerable promise, especially at a time of relatively slow 
growth and tight public finances. In practice, however, much less than 13% of GDP in 
procurement is likely to be open to international competition. If one assumes that public 
spending on health, social and education services, and core areas of defence will remain 
largely outside of competitive markets, this leaves 3-5% of GDP potentially open to 
international competition (European Commission (2011a, p. viii). Opening public 
procurement markets has also proved to be one of the most challenging areas of trade policy. 
Experience over the past 35 years shows that agreeing on the text of an agreement is only the 
first step in ensuring increased competition in public contracts. Competitive procurement also 
requires effective implementation of agreements, institutional and human resources and 
above all a commitment to open competition on the part of the purchasing entity/government.   
Public procurement accounts for a larger share of GDP in the EU (with variations among 
member states) than in the US, for example. This is largely because the EU public sector is 
larger than that of the US. Most EU member states also have a state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
or parastatal sector (see Figure 1). In the EU internal procurement regime, central entities, sub-
central entities and utilities are all covered by procurement rules and the EU has extended this 
approach to the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreements (GPA).  
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Figure 1. The share of public procurement in GDP for general government and utilities  
 
Sources: OECD National Accounts Database and Eurostat. Data for Australia are based on a combination of 
Government Finance Statistics and National Accounts data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
 
This means that the EU approach is more comprehensive than that of the US. As discussed 
above, not all procurement is subject to competition because large shares go to expenditures 
on health and social programmes, education, energy or defence. Figure 1 shows the total share 
of public procurement in other major markets.   
2.2 The debate on the openness of procurement markets 
The general picture 
The relative size and openness of the EU and US procurement markets has been the subject of 
considerable debate. As in any trade negotiation, reciprocity has been an important factor in 
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past and present discussions, so differences over the relative openness of markets have been a 
significant complicating factor and there are no unchallenged objective data with which to 
make a comparison. At a very general level, a recent study (Messerlin & Miroudot, 2012) takes 
the overall penetration ratios of public procurement based on imports. This appears to show 
the EU to have a lower penetration rate than China and India, but higher than that of the US 
(see Table 1). The penetration ratio here is based on direct imports as a share of the total public 
demand for goods and services, defined as the final consumption expenditure (government 
final consumption expenditure consists of expenditure, including imputed expenditure, 
incurred by general government on both individual consumption goods and services and 
collective consumption services). This definition of market opening therefore considers the 
general picture for the public sector as a whole.  
 
Table 1. Penetration ratios of public procurement markets (selected countries and years) 
 
Market 
1995 2000 2005 2007 
European Union 2.6 3.6 4.2 4.5 
Brazil 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 
China 3.8 3.4 5.6 5.2 
India 4.2 4.4 5.8 6.3 
Japan 1.9 2.3 3.2 4.2 
Turkey 5.4 5.8 9.5 10.9 
US 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 
Source: Summary of data provided in Messerlin & Miroudot (2012). 
 
As the data in Figure 2 show, small markets, including the small EU member states if these are 
taken as separate markets, tend to have a higher import-penetration ratio. This is to be 
expected given that smaller economies will not have the local/national capacity to supply all 
the goods and services required by their governments. If one takes the EU as a single market, 
one would clearly expect import penetration to be lower than in small markets and lower 
perhaps than developing-country markets as the EU possesses the capacity to supply the most 
advanced, high-value contracts, which some developing economies will be unable to do. 
Figure 2, indeed, shows a correlation between market size and ‘openness’ (in other words, 
imports to total public consumption) and shows the EU and US as roughly equivalent in terms 
of their degree of openness on this measure.  
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Figure 2. GDP and openness ratios, 2008 
 
Source: Messerlin & Miroudot (2012). 
 
2.3 Access via investment  
The import penetration in Table 1 also relates to ‘imports’ or what the European Commission 
has termed direct imports, in other words goods and services crossing borders. It is, however, 
a feature of procurement markets that access is often achieved through foreign investment in 
the target market, which helps get around de facto preferences in that contracts awarded to 
local goods and services create local jobs and economic activity, even if the firm is foreign-
owned. In the EU, cross-border supply of public procurement markets accounts for only 1.6% 
of public contracts and 3.5% of the value of public procurement. But indirect supply via an 
affiliate accounts for 11% of contracts and about 14% of the value of public procurement 
(European Commission, 2011b). This indirect access to EU markets appears to be focused on 
‘supplies’ (goods) rather than services or works (construction). Indirect imports make up 25% 
of the value of EU supplies contracts, compared to just 6% for works and 12% for services. 
Access therefore clearly depends on the ease of establishment and whether inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is blocked or discouraged. This is seldom the case in transatlantic trade 
as both the EU and the US are open to foreign direct investment except in limited cases when 
the host state wishes to defend its national champion against such competition. But the option 
of setting up an affiliate will be less attractive to small- or medium-sized companies. 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be equivalent data for indirect access to the US market, 
and so again it does not seem possible to conduct an objective comparison of how open 
markets are. But one can assume that larger EU suppliers wishing to access the US market will 
have considered doing so via affiliates.  
6  WOOLCOCK & GRIER 
 
2.4 Value of procurement covered under commitments in agreements  
In the absence of comparable data, the European Commission has produced an estimate of 
relative market opening, summarised in Table 2 below. This appears to be based on 
commitments made in international agreements for contestable markets above the thresholds 
in the GPA. But the US has disputed the accuracy of these figures.  
Table 2. Share of procurement covered by commitments  
 EU US Japan Canada Brazil India China 
Total procurement 
Above GPA threshold (€ bn) 
370 559 96 59 25 42 20  
% of GDP 3% 3% 3% 6% 3% 4% 2%  
Percentage of procurement 
Internationally committed 
95% 32% 28% 16% 65% 0 0  
Source: European Commission (2012). 
2.5 Strategic market access  
These general figures for procurement and the degree of openness do not address the question 
of what might be called strategic market access. In certain sectors, large public contracts can 
make a significant difference between business success and failure. In other words winning a 
large public contract can have a significant effect on the relative competitive position of 
companies. This is especially the case in sectors such as aerospace where strategic trade policy 
conditions could be said to apply. The same features, however, are also present in other sectors 
such as rail transport, energy, non-lethal defence equipment and even construction. In these 
sectors, therefore, tacit support for national companies in the awarding of contracts is 
something that is very difficult to address and even governments that would otherwise follow 
liberal procurement policies have arguably found ways of awarding contracts to national 
suppliers. The recent EU debate on a Regulation to enhance the EU’s negotiating leverage, 
which has not been adopted, drew on these kinds of strategic market access objectives.1   
3. International procurement rules and EU and US commitments   
3.1 International procurement agreements  
When the international trading system was established in 1947 under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), government procurement was explicitly excluded. As a 
consequence, there were no constraints on the adoption and application of de jure and de facto 
‘buy local’ policies and practices. This unfettered use continued for more than three decades 
until procurement was brought under international trade disciplines. In 1981, the first 
international procurement agreement – the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GATT Code) – was implemented. As a plurilateral agreement, it only opened the 
procurement of the GATT members that accepted it and did not provide most-favoured-nation 
                                                   
1 See Regulation on access to international procurement markets COM (2012) 124 final 21.3.2012. 
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treatment (MFN) to non-Code parties.2  It was also limited in scope, applying only to the 
procurement of goods by the central government entities listed by each party in the agreement. 
It did not apply to services or other types of entities. The GATT Code was replaced by the 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which was established under the WTO in 1996.3   
The GPA significantly expanded procurement subject to international disciplines to include 
services and construction services, as well as procurement by sub-central government entities, 
utilities and government enterprises. Currently, the GPA has 15 parties. Given that the EU and 
its 28 member states constitute one party, the GPA covers the procurement of 43 WTO 
members.  
In December 2011, the GPA parties concluded a decade-long negotiation to revise the GPA.4 
The negotiations, which were led by the US and the EU, resulted in an expansion of the 
procurement covered by the Agreement5  and an overhaul of its text.6  In April 2014, the 
revision entered into force for two-thirds of the GPA parties, including the EU and the US.7  
3.2 The elements of international procurement agreements 
The negotiations on procurement in the TTIP are expected to follow the template that has been 
established over the years in international procurement agreements and is reflected in the GPA 
and bilateral FTAs. This template has two parts. One concerns coverage or market access 
commitments, often called ‘liberalisation’, which are based on negotiations aimed at achieving 
reciprocal commitments.   
Neither the EU nor the US covers all of its procurement under any international procurement 
agreement. Instead, each specifies the procurement that it promises to conduct in accordance 
with the provisions of the agreement based on several elements, including lists of procuring 
entities. The second part of agreements is comprised of the principles such as national 
treatment and the procedural disciplines that apply to the procurement that is covered. See 
Box 1 for the elements of coverage commitments and the procurement rules.   
  
                                                   
2 Those members included the US, the European Economic Community and its member states (Belgium, 
Denmark, Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom), Austria, Finland and Sweden.  
3 Grier (2013b).  
4 World Trade Organization (2011). 
5 Grier (2014b and d). 
6 Grier (2013c). 
7 World Trade Organization (2014). 
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Box 1. Elements of International Agreements on Public Procurement  
Coverage 
Rules in international agreements generally cover procurement of supplies (goods), works 
(construction) and services. Coverage is defined by several elements: 1) thresholds (monetary values 
at and above which the agreement applies to procurement), which are designed to ensure that the 
most valuable contracts are open to competition and avoid the significant compliance costs of 
imposing international disciplines on smaller contracts; 2) the entities covered, as specified in three 
categories (central government, sub-central governments and other entities, such as utilities and 
SOEs); 3) negative list of goods, which means that the procurement of all goods is covered except 
those explicitly excluded; coverage of defence goods is generally based on a positive list; 4) services, 
including construction services, with coverage based on a positive list (only listed services are 
covered) or negative list (all services are covered except those listed); and 5) exclusions. [The 
coverage of the EU and US under the GPA is set out in Table 3.] 
National treatment  
A cornerstone of public procurement agreements is non-discrimination. Parties must provide 
national treatment for all covered procurement. This requires parties to treat the goods, services, 
and suppliers of other parties no less favourably than domestic goods, services and suppliers. They 
may not apply domestic preferences and other discriminatory purchasing provisions for 
procurement covered by an international agreement. National treatment obligations are the main 
means by which de jure preferences for specific categories of suppliers are tackled.  
Transparency 
Central to the aim of facilitating increased international competition, more efficient purchasing and 
reduced scope for corruption in public procurement is the provision of information. Transparency 
and procedural obligations are aimed at ensuring that procurement covered by an international 
agreement is conducted in a manner that is transparent, predictable, fair and non-discriminatory. 
This encompasses both information on the procurement system, as well as information on each stage 
of the specific procurement, including development of technical specifications, publication of 
notices of intended procurement and invitations to request participation in procurements, provision 
of tender documentation, tendering process, use of negotiations and contract awards. It also 
includes post-contract award transparency in which purchasing entities are obliged to explain 
contract award decisions and publish awards.  
Contract award procedures 
In order to ensure flexibility, procurement rules in international agreements tend to provide for 
open, selective and limited tendering. Open tendering allows all interested suppliers to participate 
and may be based on price or most advantageous tenders. Selective tendering is used when the 
procuring entity invites only suppliers that meet certain qualification requirements to submit 
tenders. It requires competition and transparent procedures for the selection of qualified suppliers. 
Limited tendering is when the procuring entity invites specific suppliers to submit tenders. 
Agreements include more or less detailed rules on how invitations for tender are issued, what 
information is provided, and what time limits are set for bidding and for awarding contracts. Short 
time limits may put foreign bidders at a disadvantage, while long time limits may be be detrimental 
to the work of the procuring entity. 
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Technical specifications 
Through specifications, a procuring entity can tailor the requirements for a procurement to match 
the capabilities of certain (local) suppliers. To avoid this outcome, rules encourage the use of 
international standards and performance standards over design (or prescriptive) standards. Where 
design standards are used, tenders of equivalent goods or services should be allowed.  
Exemptions or exclusions 
Agreements generally provide for exclusions of procurement from national treatment obligations 
for reasons of human health, national security and law enforcement.  
Enforcement and compliance 
Experience has shown that without effective compliance, rules on public procurement will have 
little effect. Given the thousands of contracts that are awarded every day, central compliance 
monitoring is impracticable. Rules therefore provide bidders who believe they have not been fairly 
treated with an opportunity to seek an independent review of a contract award decision. Penalties 
in the case of non-compliance may involve project cancellation, requirements to retender or financial 
penalties (limited to the costs of bids or exemplary damages). Rules requiring information on 
contracts awarded and reasons why bids failed can also facilitate compliance. 
 
3.3 EU and US commitments under international agreements   
The EU and the US have exchanged extensive procurement commitments under two 
international agreements, the GPA (see Table 3) and a 1995 exchange of letters (see Table 4).8 
Under those agreements, the US gives the EU the best access to its procurement that it offers 
any trading partner. In fact, it gives the EU better access than others because the 1995 
agreement opens up procurement not provided to any other party. Under the GPA, the US 
does not withhold any of its procurement from the EU. But the EU does not reciprocate by 
providing the US with its best coverage. Instead, it denies the US the legal rights to participate 
in a significant portion of its GPA-covered procurement. This denial of de jure access applies to 
the procurement of services by its sub-central entities, procurement by EU utilities (except in 
the electric sector) and at least 200 central government entities of its member states. The EU 
withholds this procurement in response to US coverage. This disparity is less significant than 
it appears because US companies often have de facto access to the excluded procurement. 9  
  
                                                   
8 Grier, (2013a).  
9 Grier, (2014k). 
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Table 3. EU and US coverage under GPA and relevance to TTIP 
Elements of 
coverage 
EU coverage US coverage Issue in TTIP? 
Central 
government  
   
Thresholds: 
goods and 
services 
130,000 Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) 
130,000 SDRs Not likely TTIP issue. EU 
Directives apply same 
threshold as GPA; EU has 
not applied lower 
thresholds in FTAs. But, 
US often applies lower 
thresholds in other FTAs. 
For example, it applies a 
$100,000 threshold in the 
US-Korea FTA. Since US 
reserves most federal 
procurement at and below 
$150,000 for small 
businesses, there would be 
little value in a threshold 
below that level. 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities Covers 3 EU-wide entities 
(Council, Commission and 
European External Action 
Service) and all central 
government entities of 
member states; withholds 
approximately 200 entities 
from access by US 
85 federal entities, with several 
exclusions, including 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Both could expand their 
coverage. US should be 
able to cover all federal 
agencies subject to the 
Federal Acquisition 
Regulation. The EU should 
be able to provide the US 
with comprehensive 
coverage of central 
government entities of 
member states and cover 
more EU-wide entities. 
Sub-central 
government 
   
Thresholds: 
Goods and 
services 
200,000 SDRs 
 
355,000 SDRs EU is seeking reduction. 
US likely to resist because 
of difficulty of obtaining 
necessary agreement of 
states. 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities All regional or local 
contracting authorities and 
all contracting authorities 
that are bodies governed by 
public law, as defined by EU 
public procurement 
directive. Includes indicative 
lists of entities covered. 
37 states (see Table 4) EU seeks expanded 
coverage of states, 
including the 13 states not 
covered by the GPA and 
greater access to the 
procurement of the 37-
covered states.  
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Restrictions on 
coverage 
EU denies rights to US 
suppliers to participate in 
services procured by its sub-
central entities. 
 
Exclusions include domestic 
content restrictions that apply to 
federally-funded highway and 
mass-transit projects and state-
specific exclusions  
EU seeks removal of the 
restrictions for mass transit 
projects. 
Utilities and 
government 
enterprises 
   
Thresholds: 
Goods and 
services 
400,000 SDRs $250,000 for federal enterprises; 
400,000 SDRs for other entities 
 
Thresholds: 
Construction 
services 
5,000,000 SDRs 5,000,000 SDRs  
Entities All contracting entities 
whose procurement is 
covered by EU utilities 
directive and which are 
contracting authorities 
covered by the GPA. It also 
covers public undertakings, 
which are engaged in 
activities in sectors that 
include drinking water, 
electricity, airports, maritime 
or inland ports and 
transportation (railways, 
urban railways, automated 
systems, tramway, trolley 
bus, bus and cable); Includes 
indicative lists of entities. 
Federal electric utilities 
(Tennessee Valley Authority and 
four Power Administrations), St. 
Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation. 
3 sub-central entities (Port 
Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, Port of Baltimore and New 
York Power Authority).  
Waives domestic content 
requirements for power 
generation and 
telecommunication projects 
financed by Rural Utilities Service.  
 
Restrictions Excludes US from all 
utilities, except electric 
sector. 
Excludes domestic content 
restrictions that apply to federal 
funds provided for airport 
projects.  
 
Goods Covers all goods Covers all goods with several 
exceptions 
 
Defence goods Positive list of goods 
procured by defence and 
security entities. 
Positive list of goods that are 
generally covered, subject to 
national security exception 
 
Services Uses positive list which lists 
only the services that it 
covers, including most land 
and air transport services 
and all telecommunications 
services. 
EU does not give US rights 
to services procured by its 
sub-central entities. EU also 
provides US with access to a 
covered service only if US 
also covers that service.  
Uses negative list to cover all 
services except transportation 
services; services associated with 
management and operation of 
government facilities, or privately 
owned facilities used for 
governmental purposes; public 
utilities services (except 
enhanced/value-added 
telecommunications services); and 
R&D services. Excludes printing 
for states. It provides EU with 
access to a covered service only if 
EU covers it. 
EU could adopt negative 
list and US could consider 
expansion of 
telecommunications 
services. 
Source: Grier (2013a).   
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Central government entities: Under the 1994 GPA, both the EU and the US used positive lists to 
specify their coverage of central government entities. The US continued that approach in the 
revised GPA, with the addition of 11 entities, to bring its total of covered entities to 85 – the 
most it offers in any agreement. However, in the negotiations on the revision of the GPA, the 
EU changed its approach and offered comprehensive coverage of the central government 
entities of its member states, that is, all existing entities, whether or not listed, as well as those 
created in the future. But it reserved this comprehensive coverage for members of the 
European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and the 
Netherlands with respect to Aruba. For the US and other GPA parties, the EU not only 
continued to use a positive list, but it also withheld some of the listed entities – more than 200 
listed entities in the case of the US.10  
Sub-central coverage: With regard to sub-central entity coverage, the EU provides 
comprehensive coverage of the sub-central entities of its member states, but withholds their 
purchases of services from the US. US sub-central coverage is not as comprehensive. Under 
the GPA, it covers 37 of its 50 states11 and not all of the procurement of those states. A variety 
of restrictions apply to the states.12 For example, the US takes an exception for the domestic 
content restrictions that are attached to federal funds given to states for mass-transit and 
highway projects. In addition, the states open their procurement at a threshold that is almost 
twice that of the EU’s sub-central entities (355,000 SDRs versus 200,000 SDRs). See Table 4 on 
US States covered under GPA and the 1995 exchange of letters.  
In addition to the GPA, the US opens procurement of several sub-central entities under a 1995 
US-European Communities Exchange of Letters.13 That Agreement, which does not include 
any EU commitments, provides EU suppliers with access to the procurement of two states not 
covered by the GPA (North Dakota and West Virginia) and Illinois state procurement that is 
not covered under the GPA. The obligation in the Exchange of Letters is limited to best of out-
of-state treatment for EU suppliers, but only if the state considers non-state suppliers in a 
procurement. It also commits to best of out-of-city treatment by seven cities (Boston, Chicago, 
Dallas, Detroit, Indianapolis, Nashville and San Antonio), if they consider bids from suppliers 
outside of their cities. Finally, that Agreement provides that the Massachusetts Port Authority 
will provide best of out-of-state treatment if it considers non-Massachusetts suppliers. That 
agreement does not include thresholds or any exclusions.14   
  
                                                   
10 Grier (2014f). 
11 The 13 states that are not covered by the GPA are: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. 
12 Grier (2014n). 
13 Office of the US Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/government-procurement/us-
european-communities-1995-exchange-letters). 
14 Grier (2014g). 
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Table 4. US states covered under GPA and 1995 Exchange of Letters 
State GPA State-specific exclusions in GPA  1995 Exchange 
of Letters 
Arizona X None  
Arkansas X Construction services  
California X None  
Colorado X None  
Connecticut X None  
Delaware X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Florida X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Hawaii X Construction services; software developed in state  
Idaho X None  
Illinois X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
X 
Iowa X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Kansas X Construction services, automobiles, aircraft  
Kentucky X Construction services  
Louisiana X None  
Maine X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Maryland X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Massachusetts X None  
Michigan X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Minnesota X None  
Mississippi X Services  
Missouri X None  
Montana X Goods  
Nebraska X None  
New 
Hampshire 
X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
New York X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal; procurement by 
public authorities and public benefit corporations with 
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multi-state mandates; transit cars, buses and related 
equipment 
North Dakota  None X 
Oklahoma X Construction services, construction-grade steel 
(including requirements on subcontracts), motor 
vehicles, coal 
 
Oregon X None  
Pennsylvania X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts), motor vehicles, coal 
 
Rhode Island X Boats, automobiles, buses, related equipment  
South Dakota X Beef  
Tennessee X Services, including construction services  
Texas X None  
Utah X None  
Vermont X None  
Washington X Fuel, paper products, boats, ships, vessels  
West Virginia  None X 
Wisconsin X None  
Wyoming X Construction-grade steel (including requirements on 
subcontracts, motor vehicles, coal 
 
Source: Grier (2014n).  
 
Other entities (utilities and government enterprises): Under the GPA, the EU covers a broad 
spectrum of utilities in sectors that include drinking water, electricity, airports, maritime or 
inland ports and transportation (railways, urban railways, automated systems, tramway, 
trolley bus, bus and cable). But it withholds US access to all except the electric sector in 
response to the limitations in US coverage. The US covers only federal electric utilities plus 
several other entities in other sectors. In the revision of the GPA, the US expanded its coverage 
by extending its waiver of domestic content requirements that apply to funding by the Rural 
Utilities Services, a unit of the Department of Agriculture, to include telecommunications 
projects, (see Table 3).   
Exclusions: Since its implementation of the GATT Code, the US has excluded procurement that 
it sets aside for its small and minority businesses from the GPA and FTAs. The federal 
government uses set-asides to help it meet the directive in the Small Business Act of 1953 to 
award a portion of its procurement to small and minority businesses. The current target is 
almost a quarter (23%) of federal procurement. The US Congress has explicitly prohibited 
waiver of the small business set-asides.15  
                                                   
15 Grier (2014i). 
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3.4 EU and US commitments under bilateral and regional FTAs  
In addition to their GPA membership, the EU and the US have undertaken procurement 
commitments with other trading partners in bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
(FTAs). The US is a party to 13 FTAs that cover the procurement of 19 countries on terms and 
conditions similar to those in the GPA. Several of those countries (Canada, Israel, Republic of 
Korea and Singapore) are also GPA parties. The only US FTA that does not include robust 
procurement commitments comparable to the GPA is its FTA with Jordan. That FTA’s 
procurement provision is limited to a commitment that the parties engage in negotiations on 
Jordan’s accession to the GPA. In addition to FTAs, in 2010, the United States and Canada 
negotiated a procurement agreement in which they exchanged sub-central coverage, and 
Canada opened up the procurement of its provinces and territories for the first time.16  
The EU has included public procurement provisions in all of its comprehensive bilateral trade 
agreements. The agreements negotiated with GPA signatories such as the Republic of Korea, 
Canada and Singapore, simply apply the GPA rules but extend commitments. In the case of 
Canada in the CETA agreement, Canada extended its commitments to include its 
municipalities, municipal organisations, school boards and publicly funded academic, health 
and social service entities (MASH sector) for the first time. In preferential agreements signed 
with middle developing countries, such as those with Colombia and Peru and Central 
America, the EU has included procurement rules largely based on the GPA. With these 
partners the EU has accepted a degree of asymmetry in commitments in that it has offered 
more or less the same level of commitments to these countries as to GPA signatories but 
accepted more limited commitments from the countries concerned.   
The EU–CARIFORUM agreement also includes rules very similar to those of the GPA, but it 
does not include coverage commitments, which are to be decided by the parties in the future. 
In its preferential agreements with developing countries such as the other ACP states 
procurement is envisaged for a later stage.17   
4. Enhancing access to procurement markets  
4.1 De jure and de facto barriers to access  
The de jure preferences take the form of, for example, ‘buy national’ policies, which grant 
national suppliers a price preference as in the case of the US since the 1930s, in the case of the 
utilities Directive in the EU and in many other countries today. There are also de jure 
preferences for small- and medium-sized companies, used by developed as well as developing 
countries, such as US set-asides for its small and minority businesses. There is also a trend 
towards the use of public contracts to promote other policy objectives, such as through the use 
of ‘green’ procurement’ that can constitute a potential barrier to access. Such de jure preferences 
can be targeted by national treatment commitments, such as in the GPA or a bilateral 
agreement such as the TTIP.   
But experience suggests that the main barriers to public procurement markets are less obvious, 
de facto discrimination that exists as a result of the discretion available to contracting 
                                                   
16 Grier (2013b). 
17 Woolcock (2013). 
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authorities or costs and other disincentives to bid. Such discretion is built into even the most 
extensive rules as a result of the flexibility necessary to accommodate the diverse nature of 
public procurement. Cost effective means of addressing such de facto discrimination are not 
easy to develop, although the OECD has developed a set of Principles for Integrity in Public 
Procurement that begin to address some of the de facto barriers.18 Requiring transparency is 
one approach, as is the specification of objective criteria for contract awards, the use of 
standard documentation and award procedures. The OECD Principles also include 
recommendations to ensure a proper cost-benefit analysis of the use of procurement in the 
pursuit of other policy objectives, better planning across the whole procurement cycle, 
promotion of procurement as a profession and tighter control of exceptional cases. Experience, 
including that with the EU internal market, suggests that much more than commitments to 
national treatment is required if there is to be increased competition. It may indeed, only come 
as a result of a paradigm shift in national policies towards acceptance of open, competitive 
markets and away from explicit or implicit policies of support for national champions and 
then usually as a result of indirect supply or exports, in other words via local affiliates.   
4.2 De jure barriers to access  
As described above, the EU and the US have exchanged extensive commitments under the 
GPA that provide substantial market opportunities in their respective government 
procurement markets. However, there are significant barriers to access in public procurement 
in both the EU and the US, and a tendency for such measures to grow, especially in the US, 
with the ‘Buy American’ provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) as a prominent example. The barriers are summarised in the following tables.  
Table 5. Restrictions on market access in the US 
Procurement Restriction Description Treatment in Trade Agreements 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
Required US-produced iron, steel 
and manufactured goods to be 
used in ARRA-funded projects 
Did not apply to projects covered 
by trade agreements 
Berry Amendment Requires Defence Department to 
purchase US-produced food and 
clothing, fabrics, specialty metals, 
stainless-steel flatware and hand- 
measuring tools. 
Covered goods are excluded from 
trade agreements 
Buy American Act of 1933 Requires federal agencies to 
purchase US goods unless a 
waiver applies 
Waived for goods covered under 
trade agreements 
Buy American Act Requires use of US-produced 
iron, steel and manufactured 
products (with 100% domestic 
content) in highway, transit, 
railway and airport projects 
funded by Department of 
Transportation, unless a waiver 
applies. 
Restriction is excluded from trade 
agreements 
                                                   
18 OECD (2009). 
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Small Business Act of 1953 Requires federal government to 
award a portion of federal 
procurement to US small and 
minority businesses 
Set-asides for small and minority 
businesses are excluded from 
trade agreements 
US-flag vessels requirements Items procured by the 
military must be carried 
on US-flagged vessels 
Procurement of transportation 
services are excluded from trade 
agreements  
Sub-central procurement 
not covered by trade 
agreements  
Use of domestic content 
requirements and insufficient 
transparency 
Not covered by trade agreements 
  
Table 6. Barriers to market access in the EU 
Cross-cutting NTM Sectors where it applies Other observations 
Favouritism of EU firms Construction  
Diverse national and local 
practices 
All sectors  
Unavailability of procurement 
statistics (regarding foreign 
bidders) 
All sectors This NTM is 
decreasing in 
importance. 
Local (domestic) content 
requirements in the bid (at 
least 50% European)  
Water (production, transport, 
and distribution of drinking 
water), energy (gas and heat), 
urban transport (urban, 
railway, automated systems, 
tramway, bus, trolley bus, 
and cable), and postal 
services 
 
Excessive delays in 
finalising the contract and 
beginning of work 
Infrastructure projects  
High level of bureaucracy 
and corruption 
Public works  
Onerous qualification 
requirements 
Government procurement  
Use of offsets in defence 
procurement 
Defence  
5. Potential Expansion of Procurement under the TTIP  
5.1 Procurement objectives of the EU and US in the TTIP 
In the February 2013 final report of the United States-European Union High Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG), the EU and US shared the goal to substantially improve 
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access on the basis of national treatment.19 Subsequently, each side has elaborated on their 
objectives for the TTIP. In March 2013, the US notified the Congress of its intention to launch 
negotiations of TTIP and its objectives.20 It subsequently pointed to its interests in expanded 
access to procurement in construction, engineering and medical devices.21 In July 2013, the 
European Commission published initial TTIP Position Papers, including one on public 
procurement.22 See Table 7 for a comparison of the EU and US objectives in the negotiations.   
Table 7. EU and US procurement objectives in the TTIP 
Joint HLWG objectives  
Enhance business 
opportunities through 
substantially improved 
access to government 
procurement contracts 
at all levels of 
government on the basis 
of national treatment  
EU objectives  
Central government entities  
- Use negative list 
- Coverage of US federal government entities not 
covered under GPA  
- Access to procurement subject to specific policies, 
such as those related to small businesses (small 
business set-asides)  
Sub-central entities 
- Coverage of the 13 states not covered by the GPA; 
removal of restrictions maintained by the 37 states 
covered under the GPA 
- Coverage of municipalities, airports, ports, transit 
authorities and railway authorities 
- Coverage of sub-central government entities 
“operating at the local, regional or municipal level, 
as well as any other entities whose procurement 
policies are substantially controlled by, dependent 
on, or influenced by sub-central, regional or local 
government and which are engaged in non-
commercial or non-industrial activities”  
Other entities: coverage of “all entities governed by 
public law, state-owned companies and similar 
operating in particular in the field of utilities” 
(special interest in transit/railways, urban railways 
and urban transport)  
Services: Coverage of all services, with specific 
interest in Information society services, particularly 
cloud-based services  
Buy American restrictions 
US objectives  
Expand market access 
opportunities for US 
goods, services and 
suppliers to procurement 
markets of the EU and its 
member states   
Ensure that US suppliers 
are treated as favourably 
as domestic and other 
foreign goods, services, 
and suppliers in the EU 
and member states   
Ensure that procurement 
is conducted in a fair, 
transparent and 
predictable manner  
Expand opportunities to 
bid on government 
contracts in areas that 
include construction, 
engineering and medical 
devices 
                                                   
19 See USTR (2013). 
20 See letter from Acting USTR Demetrios Marantis to Speaker of the US House of Representatives John 
Boehner, dated 20 March 2013 (Marantis, 2013). 
21 See USTR (2014). 
22 European Commission (2013). 
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- Removal of existing domestic content 
requirements on mass-transit and highway projects  
- Commitment to not impose any new Buy 
American requirements on federal funds given to 
states or other sub-central government entities, such 
as were imposed by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)   
Procedural disciplines: GPA-plus disciplines, 
including access to procurement information, 
technical specifications, award criteria, qualification 
procedures, domestic challenge mechanisms 
Sources: Grier (2014a); USTR (2013 and 2014); European Commission (2013); and Marantis (2013). 
 
In addition to its stated objectives, the US may be expected to seek access to the procurement 
that the EU covers under the revised GPA, but to which it does not provide access to the US. 
That includes the procurement of services by the EU’s sub-central government entities, 
procurement by EU utilities, access to EU works concessions and procurement of more than 
200 central government entities of member states.  
Expanding procurement under the TTIP will be difficult since most of the easily covered 
procurement has already been offered. Moreover, the EU and the US have engaged in 
extensive negotiations over many of the remaining issues, most recently in the revision of the 
GPA. Nonetheless, there are some areas in which the two parties should be able to build on 
their existing commitments (see Table 3). The potential areas are explored in this section, along 
with the constraints.   
5.2 Comprehensive central government coverage   
In the TTIP, the EU and the US should exchange comprehensive coverage of central 
government entities, providing one another with the best coverage of central government 
entities that they offer any trading partner. This could be accomplished with the EU proposal 
to base TTIP coverage of central government coverage in the TTIP on a negative list. For the 
EU that would mean providing the US with the same comprehensive coverage of the central 
government entities of its member states that it provides to favoured parties under the revised 
GPA (see section 3.3). Comprehensive coverage could also extend beyond the three EU-wide 
entities that the EU covers under the GPA.23 
The US may not be able to mirror the EU approach by offering coverage of all federal entities 
since there is no comprehensive list of federal agencies and, without such a list, the US could 
not ensure full compliance. Nonetheless, the US should be able to offer comprehensive 
coverage of all federal entities subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR 
is the primary federal regulation that applies to the procurement of most federal agencies and 
is intended to provide “uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive 
agencies”. 24  Basing US coverage on the entities subject to the FAR should address US 
uncertainty of ascertaining all the entities that would be captured by an overly broad category, 
                                                   
23 Grier (2014f). 
24 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 1.101 (http://www.acquisition.gov/far/loadmainre.html). 
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while fulfilling the EU request for comprehensive coverage. If there are certain agencies that 
are subject to the FAR that the US is not able to cover for security or other reasons, they could 
be put on the negative list and excluded from the TTIP. It may be noted that the Federal 
Aviation Administration is not subject to the FAR, even though most of its regulations are 
consistent with the FAR.  
The US approach should be acceptable to the EU as it is similar to central government coverage 
used by Japan and Armenia in the GPA. Both provide comprehensive coverage of all entities 
subject to a specified law. In Japan’s case, it is covered by the Accounts Law and for Armenia, 
it is the Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia.  
If the TTIP is to set a new standard for procurement obligations, one step that would contribute 
to that goal is for the EU and the US to exchange comprehensive coverage of central/federal 
entities and to offer one another their best coverage.  
5.3 Constraints on broader sub-central entity coverage  
Less promising for expansion of commitments is sub-central coverage. The EU has placed a 
high priority on coverage of the 13 states not covered by the GPA and access to more 
procurement of the states covered by the GPA. But it will likely be very difficult for the US to 
meet fully – or perhaps even partially – the expectations of the EU for several reasons.25   
The first hurdle is the process for covering state procurement under trade agreements. As a 
consequence of the US federal system of government, the Administration only covers 
procurement of sub-central governments, including states and cities, with that government’s 
authorisation. 26  In negotiations of prior agreements, the US Trade Representative has 
requested such authorisation from the state governors (or city mayors), on a state-by-state (or 
city-by-city) basis. Where a state has authorised coverage of its procurement, it has been 
allowed to limit its covered procurement to specific agencies and to exclude procurement of 
sensitive goods or services, such as those subject to domestic preferences.  
A second hurdle is declining state interest in covering procurement under FTAs. The US 
covers state procurement under the GPA and eight FTAs, with the number of states covered 
varying by agreement. It lists 37 states under the GPA, and it covered those same states in the 
first two FTAs to cover state procurement – the US-Chile FTA27 and the US-Singapore FTA,28 
without seeking additional authorisation from the states. However, in the subsequently 
negotiated FTAs, states were covered only with their authorization, and state participation 
declined. Thirty-one states were covered under the 2005 US-Australia FTA,29 but the number 
                                                   
25 Grier (2013d). 
26 USTR (2011). 
27 US-Chile FTA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States. 
28 US-Singapore FTA, Annex 13A, Schedule 1, For the United States, Section B. 
29 US-Australia FTA, Annex 15-A, Section B, Schedule of the United States. 
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dropped to 23 states in the 2006 US-Morocco FTA30 and to 22 states (plus Puerto Rico) in the 
US-Central American-Dominican Republic FTA.31  
In the latest FTAs – with Peru, Colombia and Panama, the US applied a reciprocity policy, 
which was aimed at encouraging state participation and avoiding the so-called ‘free-rider’ 
problem.32 Under that policy, the FTA gave rights to a state’s suppliers to participate in the 
FTA partner’s sub-central procurement only if that state authorised its procurement to be 
covered under the FTA.33 Unfortunately, the use of the reciprocity policy did not accomplish 
its aim, as only eight states and Puerto Rico agreed to bring their procurement under those 
FTAs.34 (Subsequently, two more states were added to the FTA with Peru.35)  
Another hurdle exists in states that have enacted legislation transferring the authority to cover 
a state’s procurement in a trade agreement from the governor to the legislature. Beginning in 
2005, several states, including Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota and Rhode Island, have enacted 
such legislation. Seeking the authorisation of states with this legislation is likely to result in a 
longer and more complicated process, and one that may be more politicised.  
A fourth obstacle is the lack of a mechanism that would bring states together to develop a 
unified approach to covering state procurement under agreements, and perhaps lay a 
foundation for more comprehensive coverage.36  Canada has such a mechanism under its 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), an intergovernmental agreement among its federal 
government, provinces and territories. The AIT’s chapter on procurement establishes a 
framework to ensure that all Canadian suppliers have equal access to the country’s 
procurement above certain thresholds, and that such procurement is conducted in an open 
and transparent manner. The AIT even extends to Canada’s so-called ‘MASH sector’, which 
includes all municipalities, municipal organisations, school boards and publicly funded 
academic, health and social service entities.   
As a consequence of the AIT, Canada has been able to expeditiously develop negotiating 
positions on opening procurement by its provinces and territories. This was evident in two 
recent negotiations. First, in the negotiations of the US-Canada Agreement on Government 
Procurement in 2010, Canada was able to move quickly – in only six months – to reverse its 
long-standing refusal to open the procurement of its provinces to foreign firms. With the 
agreement of its provinces, Canada offered permanent access to its provincial procurement, 
                                                   
30 US-Morocco FTA, Annex 9-A-2, Schedule of the United States. 
31 US-DR-CAFTA, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i), Section B, Schedule of the United States, List A. The United States 
provides Honduras with access to only 16 states plus Puerto Rico. CAFTA, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i), Section B, 
Schedule of the United States, List A. 
32 The ‘free rider’ situation arises where states that do not authorise coverage of their procurement in an 
FTA nonetheless gain the same access to the procurement covered under an FTA as the states that 
agreed to cover their procurement under the FTA.  
33 See for example, Peru TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of Peru, Notes 7 and 8 to the Schedule of 
Peru and Notes 1 and 2 and Schedule of the United States. 
34 Colombia TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States; Panama TPA, Annex 9.1, Section 
B, Schedule of the United States. 
35 US-Peru TPA, Annex 9.1, Section B, Schedule of the United States.  
36 Grier (2014c). 
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and to bind that coverage under the GPA, as well as temporary access to additional provincial 
and municipal construction projects. Canada undertook those commitments in exchange for 
access to the US states covered under the GPA and – most important – US agreement to not 
apply the Buy American requirement in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) to Canadian iron, steel and manufactured goods in a number of ARRA-funded 
programmes. More recently, in 2013, Canada was able to mobilise its provinces and MASH 
sector to open the procurement of both provincial utilities and the MASH sector under an 
agreement with the EU.37  
The US does not have any similar means for developing common negotiating positions with 
its states. The US should consider setting up a forum for state consultations on covering 
procurement under international agreements. Such a mechanism could build on the US 
advisory committee system that the US Congress established 40 years ago to ensure that US 
trade policy and trade negotiation objectives adequately reflect US economic and commercial 
interests. That system includes an Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), 
composed of state and local representatives from the three branches of government (executive, 
legislative and judicial), to provide advice on the impact of trade issues on state and local 
governments. While that Committee serves an important role, it is not sufficient for the type 
of consultations needed with respect to covering state procurement under trade agreements. 
Its broad membership includes only a few representatives from state governments. 38  A 
broader procurement consultation mechanism could be used for both the education of states 
on the consequences and benefits of coverage, and development of US positions. It would not 
be a panacea but it could facilitate discussions with the states.  
But, whether or not the US develops a new consultative approach to the states, greater state 
participation in the TTIP will be possible only if states are convinced that there are substantial 
benefits in a commitment to open procurement to foreign suppliers and to refrain from 
adopting new measures that would favour local suppliers. From a state’s perspective, it does 
not need a trade agreement in order to accept bids from foreign suppliers. For potential 
suppliers from the EU however, the diversity of purchasing practices does not enhance 
transparency and could well discourage them from bidding.   
A potentially more fruitful area of expansion of US sub-central procurement commitments is 
cities. The 1995 Exchange of Letters may be a model for coverage of more cities because it only 
imposes a national treatment obligation and does not impose any other procedural obligations. 
This approach could focus on cities of a certain size or cities of particular interest to EU 
suppliers.   
5.4 Coverage of utilities and government enterprises   
Of the three categories of entity coverage, the EU and the US have exchanged the narrowest 
coverage with regard to ‘other entities’, namely utilities and government enterprises. As 
described above, the EU has broad coverage of utilities under the EU’s regime and in the GPA, 
but limits US access to just its electric utilities. This limited access reflects the EU aim of offering 
only reciprocal access to US suppliers given that US coverage extends only to its federal electric 
utilities and a handful of other entities. For example, it covers a few airports, most prominent 
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of which are those under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(PANYNJ) (La Guardia, JFK and Newark) and three port authorities (PANYNJ, Port of 
Baltimore and the Port Authority of Massachusetts), as well as a scattering of transit entities 
under covered states.   
With regard to other entities, the EU is particularly interested in coverage of transit and 
railway authorities, urban railways and urban transport entities. Unless they are transit 
agencies covered under states, their participation would have to be solicited. More 
importantly, even if authorised, their coverage would be limited as long as they are subject to 
Buy American requirements that apply to railway and transit projects funded by the federal 
government.39 See section 5.5.   
One of the possible approaches to expanding procurement obligations by utilities and 
government enterprises may be to limit the commitments to national treatment, and not 
require GPA-type procedures, as in the 1995 Exchange of Letters. The primary benefit of such 
an approach for the entities would be that they would not have to alter their procurement 
procedures. The requirement to adopt GPA-type procedures, in particular, the time periods 
for tendering, may serve as a deterrent to participation by such entities. For the EU, the benefit 
would be access to the procurement of the entities. The fact that procedures do not conform to 
GPA rules would be less of an impediment for the kind of large companies that would supply 
railway or public transport equipment. The EU’s identification of those entities of greatest 
interest should facilitate US engagement with a workable number of entities.  
5.5  Buy American requirements attached to federal funding to states  
A major aim of the EU in the TTIP negotiations is to remove the application of domestic content 
requirements that apply to state and local projects, especially transit projects, undertaken with 
federal funds. Those requirements, which are often referred to as Buy American 40 
requirements, apply to iron and steel, as well as to manufactured products, used in non-federal 
infrastructure projects. European firms want to be able to participate in these projects without 
having to meet the Buy American requirements. The US has never waived these domestic 
content requirements in any agreement. Instead, it has consistently excluded them from its 
GPA and FTA obligations.41 There would be strong opposition to any alteration of the US 
position on this issue from the iron and steel industry and their supporters in the Congress.  
The US may be more amenable to a second EU aim – to obtain a US commitment that it will 
not impose any new Buy American requirement on EU suppliers when the federal government 
provides new funds to states and other sub-federal entities. In essence, the EU is seeking to 
avoid a repeat of the Buy American requirements in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (ARRA). Even though the ARRA Buy American requirement did not apply to 
procurement covered by international agreements, its effect was wide-reaching as it disrupted 
                                                   
39 Grier (2014k). 
40  The term “Buy America” is often used to refer to domestic content requirements in US federal 
government funding of state and local projects. This is in contrast to the term “Buy American,” which 
generally refers to the Buy American Act that applies to US federal government procurement of goods.  
In this paper, Buy American is used to refer to both situations.    
41 Grier (2014h). 
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EU and other country’s participation in projects, such as water projects, not covered by 
agreements.  
A commitment to not impose any new Buy American requirements in legislation authorising 
funding to states and other sub-federal entities may be more than the US Congress could 
accept. However, such a commitment that was limited to EU goods, services and suppliers 
may be acceptable. As such a measure would constitute a significant US concession, the EU 
could be expected to reciprocate with an equally difficult concession in procurement, or some 
other element of the TTIP negotiations.42  
5.6 Services coverage  
The coverage of services provides another opportunity for the EU and US to expand their 
commitments. The US bases its coverage of services in the GPA and its FTAs on the use of a 
negative list. The EU has to date used a positive list. To align their commitments to the extent 
possible, they should consider basing their services coverage on a negative list.43 That would 
provide an important foundation for them to seek similar services coverage in the next round 
of GPA negotiations.  
Use of a negative list ensures more comprehensive coverage than a positive list, because it 
means that when new services, such as cloud computing, become available, they are 
automatically covered. By contrast, where a positive list is used, a new service that becomes 
available is covered only if it fits within a category that is already covered. Since it is not always 
easy to fit a new service into existing categories, the issue of coverage of a new service can be 
subject to disputes.  
In addition, the EU and the US should seek as comparable coverage of service categories as 
possible. One area that warrants close consideration is telecommunications. Until the revision 
of the GPA, the EU did not cover all telecommunications services. In the revision, the EU offers 
all such services, but conditions access on reciprocal coverage. The US continued its limited 
offering of telecommunications services, opening only enhanced or value-added services. The 
description of its covered telecommunications services has not changed since the GPA entered 
into force in 1996. Yet, there have been significant advances in telecommunications in the 
intervening two decades. As a consequence, the US should re-examine its coverage of such 
services with the aim of updating and broadening its coverage. It could exclude specific 
services as needed for national security or other purposes.   
5.7 Exchange coverage of build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts and works 
concessions 
The EU and the US should also expand their commitments with respect to construction 
services. Currently, they open all construction services to one another, with two exceptions. 
The US excludes dredging and the EU does not extend its coverage of works concessions to 
the US. The latter would appear to be an area in which they could exchange commitments. 
While the US does not cover works concessions under the GPA, it covers build-operate-
transfer (BOT) contracts and public works concessions under its FTAs, including in the US-
                                                   
42 Grier (2014l). 
43 Grier (2014k). 
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Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). In its FTA with the EU, Korea provides that same BOT coverage. 
Since the EU has treated Korean coverage of BOT contracts as reciprocal to its coverage of 
public works concessions in both the GPA and their bilateral agreement, it should be able to 
accept US coverage of BOT contracts in the TTIP.44   
6. Impact of broader procurement coverage  
As discussed in the previous section, the prospects for government procurement in the TTIP 
are for relatively modest, incremental expansions of procurement commitments, but not a 
wholesale change in the EU-US procurement relationship or resolution of all the outstanding 
issues. While the sub-central level is of particular interest to the EU, it is also the most difficult 
for the US, as described above.  
A challenge of the TTIP procurement negotiations is the fact that the United States has opened 
most of the procurement that is within the authority of the Administration. Many of the EU’s 
requests are beyond the authority of the Administration, however, and would require changes 
in US laws or commitments by sub-central entities to bring their procurement in line with the 
discipline of the TTIP. For the US to undertake such a heavy burden, the EU would need to 
provide a strong incentive either in the procurement sector – or perhaps in other areas of the 
TTIP where the US is making demands on the EU.   
While the EU imposes significant limitations on US rights to EU-covered procurement, those 
legal restrictions do not necessarily dictate what is happening on the ground. They do not 
prohibit EU entities from procuring US goods and services in the restricted areas, such as 
services purchased by EU sub-central entities. Even where purchasing entities retain the right 
to discriminate against foreign suppliers, this does not mean that they do so. Purchasing 
entities are also interested in obtaining the best value for money and often find that this aim 
can best be achieved by purchasing from abroad. As a consequence, it would appear that US 
suppliers are relatively satisfied with their current access to EU procurement markets, 
notwithstanding their lack of legal rights.   
Moreover, market access can also be achieved in the absence of any legal commitments to not 
discriminate against foreign suppliers. As noted above, access is very often indirect via 
affiliates established in the target market. EUROPEBUSINESS, a leading EU business 
organisation, has acknowledged that EU businesses have access to more procurement than is 
covered by agreements.45   
The projections offered by the impact studies of welfare gains from the TTIP provisions on 
procurement are relatively small compared to the potential gains from measures addressing 
regulatory and technical barriers to trade. The estimates put welfare gains at €10.8 billion per 
year (in the long run) from the reduction of barriers in the field of public procurement. The 
benefits derived from economic changes are expected to be higher for the EU at €9.7 billion 
per year and the US €0.9 billion (Ecorys, 2009).  
Trade flows are projected to grow slightly in procurement on both sides, but in percentage 
terms more growth will occur in the US. This is not unexpected; as discussed above, the nature 
                                                   
44 Grier (2014e). 
45 BUSINESSEUROPE (2013). 
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of the procurement markets on both sides of the Atlantic is such that indirect supply is more 
the norm. The long-term household impact and wage-level effects range between 0.0% and 
0.01% for the US and between 0.03% and 0.07% for the EU. With regard to the impact on the 
sectoral level, the motor vehicles, chemicals and food and beverages sectors in the EU are 
projected to benefit the most in percentage terms. In the US, electronics, metal production and 
machinery would gain the most (in line with the general results). In particular, construction is 
also expected to benefit in both the EU and US. These projections need to be treated with 
caution, however, as they may not have picked up some potential gains. Competition in 
procurement markets depends on potential suppliers bidding for contracts. When there are 
entrenched de facto preferences for local suppliers, this does not happen. International 
commitments such as an ambitious agreement on procurement in TTIP could provide 
potential suppliers with the confidence they need to bid for contracts they otherwise would 
not have. Nevertheless, in the field of procurement, we have a classic example of the political 
economy of liberalisation in which the benefits of liberalisation are widely diffused through 
society but the costs in terms of increased foreign competition are heavily concentrated.   
7. Impact of TTIP procurement provisions on third parties and the trading 
system  
A second core aim of TTIP is to shape broad international trade rules. As in other policy areas, 
the US and the EU have been doing this for decades through the GPA (and its predecessor) as 
well as the OECD, including the work on integrity in public procurement discussed above. 
The comprehensive preferential trade agreements negotiated by the US and the EU have 
effectively exported the GPA framework of rules to many other countries. These norms have 
also shaped other more voluntary approaches such as the UNCITRAL Model Procurement 
Law. So in terms of the framework of rules governing the procurement process, such as 
transparency and due process, the US and the EU have effectively shaped the international 
rules. By pressing ahead with efforts to effectively apply best practice in public procurement 
at all levels of government, such as those set out in the OECD principles, bilateral efforts 
promoted through TTIP would then offer a means for the EU and the US to address de facto 
barriers to competition in public procurement and reduce corruption in procurement. Whilst 
estimates of corruption are inevitably very approximate, surveys by the World Economic 
Forum have shown that bribes are more prevalent in procurement than any other activity. It 
has been estimated that as much as 20-25% of the value of public contracts could be lost due 
to corrupt practices (OECD, 2013).  
TTIP procurement commitments would not have a direct impact on multilateralism because 
there is no multilateral agreement that covers government procurement. Where there are 
government procurement agreements, commitments are made on a reciprocal basis. In so far 
as TTIP succeeds in extending liberalisation commitments, there could be some trade-
diversion effects on third countries. These are likely to be incremental given the extended 
commitments under the revised GPA.   
Extending transparency provisions, such as to more US states, and ensuring better 
implementation of existing transparency requirements by EU member states or applying best 
practice in procurement could well benefit third-country suppliers that participate in such 
procurement. Although third-country suppliers may not benefit from national treatment 
provisions, they would, for example, have the benefit of bidding for a contract from a US- or 
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EU-based affiliate. In this sense there could well be positive externalities from TTIP provisions 
on procurement.  
In terms of shaping international rules in the field of procurement, the EU and the US have 
effectively done so through their contributions to the development of the GPA and through 
the promotion of those agreed GPA rules in their respective FTAs. However, the TTIP could 
contribute to the international procurement arena by setting a new standard for procurement 
agreements. If the terms of the TTIP go beyond current procurement agreements, in particular, 
the GPA, it would likely provide the basis for the inclusion of its liberalisation of procurement 
in other agreements. If the US expands its sub-central coverage in the TTIP from its GPA 
coverage, it would set a baseline for future FTA and GPA negotiations. If the TTIP includes 
procurement rules that go beyond the revised GPA, they could provide the basis for 
incorporation in a subsequent revision of the GPA. Also, such new rules would likely be 
incorporated in any new FTAs that the EU and the US negotiate.  
8. A living agreement  
A Bilateral Procurement Forum, which the EU and the US established at the conclusion of the 
negotiations on the GPA revision, could provide the foundation for on-going dialogue, 
cooperation and collaboration on outstanding procurement issues. In December 2011, the EU 
and the US set up the Forum to continue work on procurement issues that were not resolved 
during the GPA negotiations. The Forum sets out three tracks: a dialogue on regulatory 
procurement issues, a dialogue on international procurement issues and exploration of 
possible expansion of their procurement commitments on a reciprocal basis.   
The Forum’s regulatory element provides an opportunity for an enhanced understanding of 
the respective procurement systems. It could also be used to address specific issues raised by 
either party’s private sector with regard to their respective procurement markets. In this 
respect, bilateral efforts could support and draw on work carried out in the OECD. The OECD 
has developed a number of principles for integrity in public procurement, which could 
contribute to addressing de facto barriers to competitive procurement markets. The OECD 
principles include, for example, the provision of adequate transparency throughout the entire 
procurement cycle, so covering how contracts are managed as well as calls for tenders and 
contract award procedures. They also call for greater professionalism in procurement, proper 
auditing and the empowerment of civil society, the media and wider public opinion to 
scrutinise procurement (OECD, 2009).  
Bilateral efforts could also promote common approaches to new challenges. For example, the 
increased tendency of governments to use public procurement as an instrument of 
environmental or other policies, such as promoting small- and medium-sized companies, 
could result in new distortions to competition if not adequately addressed. The increased use 
of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) could also pose a challenge and is another area where 
the development of agreed norms or codes could help to avoid the creation of new restrictions. 
The use of TTIP to promote compatibility between procurement systems such as in the use of 
e-procurement could enhance supplier confidence.46 The furtherance of such principles by the 
EU and the US could then set a standard for wider international practice.  
                                                   
46 See OECD (2013). 
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Under the international leg of the Forum, the EU and the US could also explore and coordinate 
positions on a variety of international procurement issues, such as China’s accession to the 
GPA. Cooperation on preparing requests for improvements in China’s offers (and for Russia 
when it begins its GPA accession in 2016) would strengthen their leverage. They could also 
develop a coordinated approach to encourage other countries, such as the other BRICS (Brazil, 
India and South Africa) to join the GPA.  
The Forum’s third part – exploration of expansion of procurement commitments – could be 
used to add new entities after the Agreement is concluded. The US has used this approach for 
states in several FTAs, in which it has a continuing obligation to add states after the FTA enters 
into force. For example, the US added five states to the US-Australia FTA after it entered into 
force and two states to its FTA with Peru after it was implemented.   
9. Conclusion 
Public procurement poses challenges when it comes to ‘liberalisation’. Most of the low-
hanging fruit has been picked, so that further progress will not be easy. As outlined above, 
there are several areas in which the US and EU could make, at least, modest expansions in 
their respective procurement commitments and seek to accord one another with the best 
treatment that they provide under trade agreements.  
But if the US and EU are unable in the TTIP negotiations to reach a level of commitments that 
sets a higher standard for international commitments, there would appear to be two broad 
options. The first option would be to continue to negotiate on procurement as part of a living 
agreement. Here reciprocal concessions would be within the procurement sector. As this paper 
has illustrated, however, this is unlikely to be done quickly given the work required at the 
domestic level, such as to get US states or cities to authorise coverage. The second option 
would be to make further progress on liberalisation of procurement markets by linking with 
other policy areas under negotiation in the TTIP. If the TTIP aim of contributing to welfare 
gains and economic growth are to be achieved, this would be the option to follow.   
In terms of the TTIP’s second broad objective of shaping the rules for international trade, the 
US and the EU have effectively done this through the plurilateral GPA and the extension of 
GPA rules to other countries through their bilateral FTAs. At issue in the procurement field is 
less setting the rules that would be applied in national procurement laws, which has arguably 
already been achieved, but more promoting best practices in procurement by fully applying 
principles such as those developed by the OECD throughout all public procurement in the US 
and EU. 
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